Abstract. This paper proposes a new signature scheme based on two hard problems : the cube root extraction modulo a composite moduli (which is equivalent to the factorisation of the moduli, IFP) and the discrete logarithm problem(DLP). By combining these two cryptographic assumptions, we introduce an efficient and strongly secure signature scheme. We show that if an adversary can break the new scheme with an algorithm A, then A can be used to sove both the DLP and the IFP. The key generation is a simple operation based on the discrete logarithm modulo a composite moduli. The signature phase is based both on the cube root computation and the DLP. These operations are computationally efficient.
Introduction
Since the Diffie-Hellman seminal paper New Directions in Cryptography which introduced the concept of public key cryptography, many asymmetric cryptosystems and signature schemes were proposed. The new technics are based on hard mathematical problems. Among these signature, we can cite the famous RSA [13] which security relies on the impossibility of factoring a large integer. By the same way, Rabin in [12] proposed an RSA look alike signature based on the difficulty of extracting the square root modulo a large composite integer. Taking square root modulo a composite prime is equivalent to the factorization of the moduli. In another context, El Gamal introduces an efficient and simple signature in [5] . The security of the new scheme is based on discrete logarithm problem. The DLP is computationally very hard to solve when considering a prime field or the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field.
Note that all these schemes are based on single problems. In this paper, we combine different cryptographic assumptions, namely the DLP and the IFP to design an efficient and strongly secure signature algorithm. In other words, we introduce a new signature which security is based both on the cube root extraction modulo a large integer and the discrete logarithm problem modulo the same moduli.
In 1979, Rabin [12] introduced a digitalized signature which he showed to be secure as factoring. To sign a message m ∈ Z * n , where n = pq is the product of two large primes, it suffices to compute s ≡ m 1/2 mod n. The verification process of the signature s is given by testing if s 2 ≡ m mod n. The advantage of the Rabin cryptosystem is that the verification s 2 ≡ mmod n is easily computable and the fact that computing m 1/2 mod n is as hard as factoring the modulus n when the factors of n are kept secrete. In the same paper, Rabin extends his encryption function to E(x) ≡ x 3 mod n, where n is the product of two large primes p and q. In [2] , D. Brown shows that if n is an RSA modulus and if the RSA public key e is equal to 3, then recovering m 3 mod n is equivalent to the factorization of n.
On the other hand, the composite discrete logarithm problem (CDLP) is used to design public key and signature schemes and certain protocols. It can be enounced as follows : for well chosen n and g, solve g
x mod n. In [7] , Hastad et al. show, under the assumed intractability of factoring a Blum integer n, that all the bits of g x mod n are individually hard. They also show that the function f g,n = g x mod n can be used for efficient pseudorandom bits generators and multi-bit commitment schemes. Bach in [1] , shows that solving the CDLP for a composite moduli n is as hard as factoring n and solving it modulo primes.
In [10] , McCurley proposed a variant of the Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol for which we can prove the decryption of a single key requires the ability to factor a composite integer. He also proposed an El Gamal signature scheme based on the CDLP in the same paper. At PKC'00, Pointcheval [11] introduces an efficient authentication scheme based on the CDLP and more secure than factorization.
Combining many hard cryptographic assumptions to design efficient schemes is a good solution for offering a long term security. In [8] , Ismail et al. introduce an efficient cryptosystem which security is based both on the square root extraction and th CDLP. Their scheme is show secure against the three common algebraic attacks using heuristic security technique. By the same way, Ciss et al. in [3] propose an efficient public key cryptosystem which security relies both on the DLP and the IFP. They show that if there is an algorithm which can break their scheme then it could be used to solve the IFP and the DLP.
In this paper, we present an efficient and strongly secure signature scheme on the cube root extraction (IFP) and the CDLP. The scheme is quite simple and presents some advantages from some schemes based on the square root problem since in our proposition we find only one solution for the cubic equation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : in the next section, we present the new scheme : the key generation algorithm, the signature and the verification functions. In section 3, we provide a security analysis of the new scheme. The efficiency of our signature will be given in section 4.
The new scheme
Let us recall first the following lemma we will use before introducing the new scheme.
Lemma 1. Let p be a prime number such that p ≡ 2 mod 3. Then, the function
is a bijection with inverse function
Key generation
1. Choose two random safe primes p and q (Gordon primes) such that p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 and compute n = pq. 2. Take α a primitive element in Z * n = {z, gcd(z, n) = 1} with order o(α). 3. Pick a random a < o(α) and compute A = α a mod n Thus, the public key is given by (n, α, A) and the private key by (n, α, a).
Signature
To encrypt a message M , Alice proceed as follows 1. He transform the message into m ∈ Z n , 2. He chooses an integer k < ϕ(n) at random such that gcd(k, ϕ(n)) = 1 3. And compute s ≡ (k(h(m) + a) mod ϕ(n)) 1/3 mod n and K ≡ α k −1 mod n and send (s, K, m) to Bob.
Verification
To verify the signature of Alice, Bob test if
If the key generation and the signature phase are well executed, then the verification process is correct.
Proof. In fact,
Note that the equation x 3 ≡ c 1 mod n has only one solution since it has a unique solution modulo p and a unique solution modulo q by Lemma 1. Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we recover the unique solution of the equation modulo n. The fact we have here a single solution of the cubic equation is a great advantage from the Rabbin scheme where the we get four solution of the square equation.
Numerical example. Suppose we want to cipher a message m = 345 with our scheme. Let's consider p = 17 and q = 29 and n = pq = 493. Remark that p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3. Let α = 11 and choose a = 23. Then, the public key is given by α, A = α a mod = 462, n and the private key by p, q and a. To sign the message m = 345, let's select k = 19. We then compute s ≡ (k(h(m) + a) mod ϕ(n)) 1/3 mod n = 102 and K ≡ α k −1 mod n = 403 using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
For the verification, we compute first K s 3 ≡ 403 272 mod n = 460 . We compute next α h(m) × A modn = 460. We can remark that the verification succeeds.
Security analysis
In this section, we show that our scheme is heuristically secure under the following three most common attacks. Recall that a signature scheme is secure if an adversary is not able to falsify a signature.
Direct attack
Suppose an adversary Adv wishes to recover all secret keys, ie p, q and a, using all informations available from the system. Then Adv needs to solve the factorization problem to find the primes p and q and solve the discrete logarithm problem to find the secrete a.
The best known technique to solve the FAC is by using the Number Field Sieve (NFS) [9] . Nevertheless, this method depends on the size of the modulus n. In other words, the complexity of the NFS method increases with the size of n. When the |n| = 1024, the NFS technique is computationally infeasible. For a better security we use strong safe primes [6] p and q such that |p| = |q| = 1024 to maintain the same security level for the DLP over primes.
Factoring attack
Assume that our adversary Adv successfully factor n. Then, he can use p and q to compute the value x 1/3 modn by solving the cube root mod p and mod q and using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to compute x 1/3 mod n. However, another problem occurs : to be able to sign, the Adv needs the values of k and a. In other words, he must solve the the DLP to find the secrete parameters. Of course, Adv knows the values of p and q. He may try to solve the DLP modulo primes and recover it modulo n. Since p and q are two safe primes of size 1024, the DLP modulo primes is infeasible and Adv would fail.
Discrete logarithm attack
Suppose Adv solves the DLP and recovers the private key a and k from A and K. Then, he needs to compute s ≡ (k(h(m) + a) mod ϕ(n)) 1/3 mod n. Since the factorization of n is not known, he can't find the value of ϕ(n) and he can't also compute the cube root modulo n. Here again, Adv would fail.
Efficiency
Designing strong and secure signature scheme is a good thing but it is essential to take in consideration the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Our scheme requiert 4 exponentiations(1 exponentiation for the key generation, 1 exponentiation in the signing phase and 2 exponentiation in the verification) and a cube root computation. These operations are very simple and can be achieve with very fast algorithms. Thus, we can claim that our new scheme is very efficient.
Conclusion
We successfully introduce a new efficient and secure signature scheme by combining two cryptographic assumptions namely the cube root extraction and the discrete logarithm problem modulo a composite integer. It's well known that most of the existing schemes are based on single problems and if an adversary could find an algorithm to solve the related problem the scheme is broken. Our scheme is prevented from this problem since it's based on two hard problems. An adversary may break it if he is able to solve simultaneously the two related problem which is very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, the new scheme is as efficient as most of the existing schemes and should be an alternative to the other signature schemes.
